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THE RELATIONSHIP OF THE STATE TO PRIVATE
OWNERSHIP OF LAND.
Lyman Chalkley.*
ORIGINAL OWNERSHIP, PARCELLING AND TENURE.
1.

The State is the original owner of all the lands, and all private titles

must be derived from it.
No one is allowed to exercise the right and liberties of holding
]and except by the express authority of the state. By "State" in this
connection is meant either the Federal power or the sovereignty of
the Commonwealth. In every case of private ownership there has
been an express grant by the sovereign power by way of a charter to
some person who receives authority thereby to enter upon the
boundary designated in the grant, and to exercise within that boundary such rights and privileges as are prescribed in the general laws.
This character of our American states as original owners of all
the lands, and source of authority to possess and enjoy lands is to
be traced to various origins. In some states it is asserted by the
state's express assumption; in some it is considered as inherent in the
state's sovereignty; in some it is sustained upon the principle of necessary construction; in some it is supposed to flow from the wording
of the treaty of peace between England and the United States. In
all the original thirteen states great numbers of tracts of land had
been granted to private persons by the authority of the sovereignty
of England before the states were independent. By the law of nations, a change of political sovereignty does not affect the mode of
tenure of private holdings of land; and by that law the holders of
lands already granted should be protected in their rights as -they
were defined by the law and existed at the time of the erection of the
state. This would certainly be true if the revolution effected a transfer from the authority of one sovereignty to the authority of another
sovereignty. The result in such cases is to substitute for the old a
* Professor of Law, University of Rentucky.
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new sovereignty to which allegiance is due and from which protection
may be demanded, but withuut affecting the terms upon which the
lands are held. If the present territory embraced within the United
States had all been derived from England, there would be very
little confusion in tracing the origin of titles. But the prior titles
to tracts within that territory are very varied indeed in their beg-nnings. The original thirteen states and the states formed from them
look to England, and perhaps some of them to France; the Northwest
Territory-was ceded to the Federal government by certain of the
original thirteen; Florida was acquired from Spain; the Louisiana
section resulted from a treaty with France; Texas came into thb
union as an independent state, but traces its origin to Mexico and
Spain; som of the Pacific coast and inferior states were from territory ceded by Mexico; Alaska was obtained from Russia; some titles
in New York are to be traced to the original Dutch regime; in
Georgia, Florida, Alabama and Mississippi there are further complications growing out of Indian titles. It is readily seen that in
each state the question of the source of private titles will be unraveled from the history of that state, and in many instances all the
titles in one state are not to be traced to a common single source.
In so great variety of origin it has become necessary to assert
the sovereign right of each state over the territory witin its own
borders, and this has been done in most instances by substituting
the present state for the sovereignty which issued the original grants.
In many of the states the constitutions or statutes contain express
assumptions of the original grants and a ratification of them through
provisions that the state is deemed to be the original and is the
ultimate owner of all the lands within its borders.
2.

Some of the States assumed original ownership over the lands before
the treaty closing the Revolution.

In the Kentucky case of Holloway v. Buck, 4 Litt. 293, a very
interesting question arose in this way. In 1775 Henderson and
Company claimed to be proprietors of large tracts derived by purchase from the Indians after the proclamafion of 1763 prohibiting
the settlement of the whites upon the western waters. Among the
adventurers of Henderson and Company entitled to a share of these
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lands was Colonel Lutterel. In that year Colonel Lutterel made his
will in which he devised the lands to which he was entitled as a partner in the company. In 1779 the legislature of Virginia enacted that
all sales and deeds, as well those which had been made as those
which should thereafter be made by any Indian or Indian nation for
the separate use of individuals to be utterly void and of no effect.
Colonel Lutterel's devisee made claim under the will for these lands,
but the court held that the will conveyed nothing, as Henderson and
Company acquired no title from the Indians. "The competency of
the Virginia legislature," said the court, "to make snh past sales
and deeds void cannot admit of a serious question."
It will be
noticed that the Virginia act was an assumption of sovereign right
over the territory now Kentucky; after the declaration of independence, it is true, but before the treaty with England, by which .that
state relinquiished its sovereignty. And the case is recognition by the
Kentucky court that the sovereign right over the district was lodged
in Virginia by its own assumption, both as to past transactions and
as to future.
3. The first problem before the American Commonwealth was the parcelling
of the puhllc domain.

The parcelling of the uninhabited portions of the territorial
domain became one of the first businesses and cares of the newly
erected states after the revolution. Never in the history of the human
race had such a problem been presented, unless in those incidents
which led to the establishment of the feudal system on the continent
of Europe. There was very little if any of the public spirit as we
understand it which would impel the states to undertake systematically to induce foreigners to come with a view to increasing the
wealth ind strengthening the political power. There was no political organization to be the cultural ground of such a spirit. The
only inducement that was urged was purely sentimental; that all
persons who were suffering from oppression at home would receive
a welcome here. The settlers believed that they were absolutely
secure from attack- from outside and therefore needed no increase
of power. They were mostly of simple and severe tastes, and wealth
was coming abundantly. They were in the state of mind of one given
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wholly to the contemplation of the beauty of peace and security accomplish-d, and possessed by a generous impulse to share their blessings with all oppressed; their vision had been realized. Ability
to read and write was far from universal. For generations, certainly
since Cromwell's time, they had hoped for a commonwealth of political freedom, of liberty, of religion, of civil equality, and of free
landholding. For their ideas and for instruction in their ideals they
depended upon their religious and political orators and oracles. The
political leaders knew Magna Carta, English and French history,
Vattel, Montesquieu, Blackstone, Lock, Virgil, Homer, Campbell,
Cicero, and Demosthenes. The preachers thundered at them of hell
and damnation, sin and salvation, using the imagery and allusion of
the Bible, Milton, Bunyan, Butler and local sages. The ancestors
of many of them had fought against the Stuarts with Cromwell;
Jefferson was teaching them the principles of the French revolution.
For generations they had been fed upon the horrors of tyrants and
violations of a crude morality. Kings and feudal lords were reminders only of what was damnable. Their traditions were filled
with hostility to the feudal system. All their conceptions were of
hardihood of body and character, bluntness and openness of bearing, of free speech, simplicity of manner and conduct, freedom from
administrative restraining, of individual initiative and responsibility,
anil absence of rule and method. Each man was of his own opinion,
and sailed in his own boat on his own bottom. The historians will
tell us that these objectives were only images firmly rooted in the
settlers' minds; not realizations in fact and practice. However that
may be it is inconveivable that men who had been trained to a life
made up of conflict with Indians and nature; whose energies were
dominated and directed by such spiritual conceptions could have
tolerated the idea of a system of landholding by which one man was
retained as the henchman of another, and subject to him for slavish
services. There was no superior, no king, no law, no church; they
were all neighbors and called each other "Brother."
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4.

After the State has parcelled the public domain by grant to private
owners, It Is yet charged with certain powers and duties in respect of
the same lands.

The nearest analogy we have to the parcelling out of the territory embraced within the limits of the states which arose after the
declaration of independence is the partition among the tribes by
Joshua. What had been taken under his leadership they treated as a
common possession, and, having divided in into districts, these they
distributed. It seems plain that the original owner of the soil was
the political sovereignty of the society of the people; and when individual ownership of parcels was recognized, the title was traced to
that sovereignty as the original appropriator or purveyor. After the
land had come into the possession of individuals, to each a designated
boundary, whether there was a political organization to protect each
in his holding and to protect the aggregate domain against foreign
aggression, and to assure each in the quiet enjoyment of his own does
not appear. Some form of political organization must have arisen
as we find it carried into practice, and without it society could not
have grown. It is apparent that in the course of its evolution society
could be preserved only by a power constituted of the united resources of all; which power would be charged with the duty of protecting each individual in the enjoyment of his private rights of
property against encroachment by members of the society within, and
to preserve the individual and aggregate rights of the members from
aggression from without. A relation would necessarily result between the political society or state and the member. The terms of
thi§ relation must be prescribed and must be punctiliously observed
by both parties, otherwise there result tyranny, injustice, inequality,
and anarchy within, and imposition from without. The individual
owes to the state, that is, the organization composed of all the citizens, loyal allegiance and support; and the state owes to each citizen and to all its citizens the liberty of self determination and action
as well in respect of his property as in respect of his personal
rights. The duties of the state as regards land are: (1) Td see to it
that the territorial domain is kepi together in its integrity, and preserved as a habitation and domicile for the political society forever.
(2) To hold this common domain subject to the common necessity.
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(3) To take care that strife between individuals shall be avoided
which will grow out of the claim by each that he is the original occupier of particular parcels. (4) To take care that strife shall be
prevented by the assurance to each citizen that he shall have security
in the enjoyment of his own parcel. (5) To see to it that strife shall
be prevented when the tenancy of a particular parcel shall become
vacant.
5.

The State's assumption of original ownership is a device to prevent the
strife which would occur If lands were freely open to occupation.

Whatever may be the true theory upon which to rest the right
of separate property in land, the established theory of .the American
Commonwealths is that the state is the original occupier and firstowner of all the lands within its territorial boundaries, thus removing
the possibility of dispute between individuals as to which is entitled
to proprietorship by priority of occupation; and that it is the exclusive prerogative of the state to'allot to the inhabitants, to each a
defined boundary of the common territory for a separate refuge and
asylum, and for sustenance.
Writing with direct reference to the function and duty of the
state to parcel out the lands held by it for the beneflt of the inhabitants in common property, and noting incidentally that separate
ownership of certain parcels or ascertained boundaries to the exclusion of other persons is to be distinguished from the mere right to
the temporary use and enjoyment of the fruits of the land, Chief
Justice Marshall says, in Johnson v. McIntosh, 8 Wheat. 595:
"It is supposed to be a principle of universal law that if an uninhabited country be discovered by a number of individuals who
ackmowledge no connection with, and owe no allegiance to any government whatever, the country becomes the property of the discoverers, so far at least as they can use it. They acquire a title in common.
The title in the whole land is in the whole society. It is to be divided
and parceled out according to the will of the society expressed by the
whole body, or by that organ which is authorized by theowhole to
express it.
"If the discovery be made, and possession of the country be
taken under the authority of an existing government, which is
acknowledged by the emigrants, it is supposed to be equally well set-
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tled that the discovery is made for the whole nation, that the country becomes a part of the nation, and that the vacant soil is to be disposed of by that organ of the government which has the constitutional
power to dispose of the national domains, by that organ in which" all
vacant territory is vested by law.
"According to the theory of the British constitution, all vacant
lands are vested in the Crown as representing the nation; and the
exclusive power to grant them is admitted to reside in the Crown,
as a branch of the royal prerogative. It has already been shown
that this principle was as fully recognized in America as in the island
of Great Britain. All the lands we hold were originally granted by
the Crown. "'
6.

The British holdings in America at the commencement of the Revolution were to be divided into three classes:.

The lands that were owned by the English in America at the
time of the revolution were held under the prerogative of the king
for the benefit of the whole people of the nation as a community.
The power of parcelling or inducting individuals into the possession
of separate tracts was in the king, as well as the title. This parcelling
was accomplished in various ways: By patents or grants to large proprietors, as the Duke of York, William Penn, Lord Calvert, Lord
Fairfax, and many others; and by grants directly to occupiers for
varying numbers of acres. These latter were made upon different
considerations, as for a money consideration, or for settlement, or.for
importation of colonists. Some of the larger patents, as that to the
king's brother, the Duke of York, carried with them the powers of
administration of government. At the time of the commencement of
the revolution, the British American possessions within the thirteen
original states were to be divided into three separate classes: (1)
Those which had been patented to the large proprietors and by them
parcelled out to settlers who held of the proprietors; (2) Those which
had been granted to occupying settlers or smaller proprietors under
general laws applicable to the colonies; (3) A great partly unexplored domain of territory not yet appropriated to any great landed
proprietor, nor to any separate individual ownership, and awaiting
settlement. All three classes were held by the king as original owner
and subject to his prerogative or supreme personal power to distribute it. Whether lands were granted by the king t6 the large
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proprietors and by them in parcels to separate settlers, or directly
by the king to the individual holders and occupiers of separate tracts,
the ultimate object was to distribute the entire region to immigrants
and occupiers.
7.

The ftevolution effected a transfer of the obligation of allegiance of owners of parcelled tracts, and proprietary ownership of unparcelled tracts
to the State sovereignty.

The effect of the revolution in bringing about a change of sovereignty from the English nation to the several American states
and in bringing about a change in the mode of holding land was also
revolutionary, although it has received almost no notice at the hands
of jurists and historians. Some of the early writers laid down a first
impression. Professor Walker says (American Law):
"The effect of the revolution was to transfer to the United
States all the rights which Great Britain had acquired by discovery
or otherwise, and had not then parted with. Accordingly, in the
treaty of peace, the king expressly relinquished, for himself and his
successors, 'all claim to the government, proprietary, and territorial
rights' of the thirteen states and every part thereof."
It is impossible that Professor Walker means to say that the
king relinquished t- the United States as we now have it, the lands
which lay in Georgia, or in North Carolina, or in Virginia; especially
as no such United States existed at the time of the treaty.
In Willow River Club v. Waae, 76 N. W. 273, the Supreme
Court of Wisconsin remarked that the lands were originally granted
to colonial governments, provincial establiliments, proprietary governments or to individuals:
"And then upon the breaking out of the revolution and the
organization of each of the colonies into a separate and independent
state, confirmed by the treaty of peace in 1783, the title to such
lands as were not held by private tenure together with all the powers
of sovereignty, the prerogatives and regalities which had previously
either belonged to the Crown or to Parliament, became immediately
and rightfully vested in such state."
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The substance of this observation is that the effect of the revolution was to invest the state with the unparcelled lands and with
the rights of sovereignty which had belonged to the English people.
This would be true if the treaty effected a transfer of rights from one
sovereignty which conveyed them to another which accepted them.
But neither was there any conveyance nor acceptance.
Justice Sharwood lays it down:
"All lands are supposed to be held mediately or immediately
of the state, which has succeeded by the revolution to the feudal position of a paramount lord before that period occupied by the crown."
Certainly today no one would contend that the state is a feudal
lord, even by analogy. And no one would maixftain that, in order to
justify the prerogative of the state as original owner and occupier,
resort must be had to the feudal system for the analogy.
The Kentucky court said, in Elmendorf v. Carmichael, 3 Litt.
475: "There can be no doubt that the Commonwealth of Virginia,
when it assumed its republican character, succeeded to the rights
and privileges of the Crown of England as to her own domain."
This statement might be true and yet not justify the conclusion that
Virginia perpetuated the feudal system and feudal tenure.
8.

In parcelling to private owners the State does not divest itself of sovereign powers.

Among all the numerous questions arising out of the changes in
constitutional policy which resulted from the revolufion none has given
rise to greater discussion and none presents so great a difficulty as
this: What is the character of the original ownership of the state as
respects a specified boundary of land after the state has installed a
private person in the possession and enjoyment of it?
But the word
Undoubtedly the private person is a "holder."
'hold" is f6udal in its origin and association, and carries within its
sensd the notion of subjection to a superior in right under obligation
of personal fealty and service. In its ordinary acceptance, it means
to support and maintain against aggression and encroachment from
outside. No one will base a contention upon either meaning that the

KENTUCKY LAW JOURNAL.
owner of a tract of land in one of the American states holds it with
sovereign power over it. Since he is only an occupier for his lifetime
at most, and the land came to him from a prior owner and will pass
from him to a succeeding owner, the land itself he holds subject to
consideration of the continuing rights of the prior owner if there
are any; and of the prospective tenancy and rig]hts of his successor.
Has the American state any continuing proprietary rights in and
control over a boundary of land after it has performed its function
of parcelling to a private person? The most that can be said by way
of explicit answer is that the state is the only sovereign, and every
man holds his land subject to that sovereignty; that the state has
asserted its position as original owner of all the lands, and the private owner enjoys only such privileges in respect of his land as he
derives from the state; that the state has assumed the position as
ultimate owner and as such is the residuary holder when there is no
private person in whom the property right rests.
9.

After the adoption of the Federal Constitution the view was taken that
the relation between the State and the private owner was that of con-

tract.
If the act of the state in installing a private owner is a pure donatidn, then no doubt the private owner holds under the state at sufferance. If the act is that of contract, and the state can bind its hands
by contract, then the terms upon which the state grants are restraints
upon its sovereignty as to any future regulation.
This is a matter of much importance to the landholder, since
upon the nature of the answer hangs the whole problem of the right
of the state to make changes from time to time in the terms upon
which land is held; and, also, of the extent to which it may repeal, modify and enact police regulations. Thus could the state enact a valid law
today by which the present holders of land shall forfeit their holdings unless each holder of one hundred acres or more cultivates ten
acres of corn annually for each hundred acres? Could the state
today repeal the law of descents or the statute of wills ? Could the
state today enforce a law to the effect that owners of town lots shall
forfeit them to the public unless improvements are erected upon them
in five yearsV?
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The earlier cases are very positive in laying it down that the
relation between the state and the landholder is that of contract. But
it is to be noticed that all those cases are confined to the consideration of that provision of the Federal Constitution which enacts: "No
state shall pass any law impairing the obligation of contracts." The
later cases generally turn upon the question of the limits of the
police power, or power of the state within constitutional limitations
to regulate for the common welfare the liberty of the holder in the
user of his individual property. The latter is a general power inherent in the state's sovereignty, while the Federal Constitution is a
limitation upon that sovereignty. In both the earlier and later
cases the distinction between these two provisions has been frequently
overlooked or misunderstood by both judges and lawyers, and the
result is confusion.
10. As the States in their grants have not inserted express conditions of
tenure, such conditions will exist only as part of the unwritten or customary law, if they exist at all.

In Bridge Company v. Dix, 6 How. 545, the Supreme Court of
the United States said:
"Under every established government, the tenure of property
(the 6ourt could not have meant feudal tenure, but only the abstract
conception of the right to exercise dominion over land) is derived
mediately or immediately from the soverign power of the political
body organized in such mode or exerted in such way as the community or state may have thought proper to ordain. It can rest on
no other foundation, can have no other guarantee. It is owing to
these characteristics only, in the original nature of tenure, that appeals can be made to the laws either for the protection or assertion
of the rights of property. Upon any other hypothesis the law of
property would be simply the law of force. Now it is undeniable
that the investment of property in the citizen by the government,
whether made for a pecuniary consideration, or founded on considerations of civil or political duty, is a contract between the state,
or the government acting as its agent, and the grantee."
This statement is remarkable for the very low estimate put by
the court upon the conception of the state's sovereignty. The effect
of the decision was that the state's grant imparts a vested right of
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property to the grantee which cannot be impaired by s-ibsequent
legislation. As the states in their grants have never inserted express
conditions of tenure, such conditions will exist only as part of the
customary or unwritten law. In the Bridge Company case, the court
did not consider whether there were any such implied conditions.
The opinion of the court cannot be taken as authority that there are
no implied conditions; nor that the enforcement of implied conditions would constitute a violation of the constitutional provision as
to the impairment of the obligation of contracts. It would be a very
pertinent enquiry; Can the state officers grant land to different individuals upon different terms of holding? or is every grant from the
state upon the same terms of holding, which terms are part of the
unwritten constitution? and if the latter, what are those terms?
11. The Kentucky court has held that the State's grantee holds it untram-

melled in the manner of using it; that the mode and manner of enjoyment are left to the volition of the grantee.

In Gaines v. Buford, 1 Dana 481, the Kentucky court held to
be beyond the power of the state to enact a law which forfeited to the
state every tract of land of one hundred or more acres theretofore
granted, "unless the proprietor thereof should, if it be woodland,
cause five acres to be cleared, fenced and tended, and ten acres for
every thousand to be belted before August 1, 1825." The preamble
of the act (passed in 1824) recited the deplorable condition of confusion resulting from the conflicting land laws, and the present and
future calamities likely to result to the people, and continued:
"By all which considerations and by that solemn duty which
every government owes to its citizens to prevent injustice and impending ealamities,-this Commonwealth is called upon reluctantly
to exercise her sovereign power over the lands lying witlin her territorial jurisdiction, by exacting forfeiture for wanlt of cultivation
and improvement; which power she has hitherto forborne to exercise by substituting other acts of legislation which seemed to her
councils more liberal and less severe; but which laws have been stigmatized breaches of good faith by those who knew not the situation
of the country, nor the urgent circumstances, nor the spirit of forbearance which characterizea them."
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The reference here in the words "those who know not the situation" is to the Supreme Court of the United States speaking in the
opinion in Green v. Biddle, 8 Wheat. 1, decided in 1823.
Gaines v. Buford was decided in 1833 by Judge- Underwood,
who bad paid his respects to the legislature in 1829 by saying, in
Davis v. Ballard, 1 J. J. Marsh, 563: "We grant that the representatives of the people are shepherds to protect the flock; but they are
not exclusively such, although vested with great and extensive powers." In the former case, involving the construction of the statute of
1824, the same judge said:
"It thus appears that the legislature tas, in the most deliberate manner, asserted the power to forfeit lands for a failure to cultivate and improve them as the legislature may from time to time
direct. Under this power by the act in question, the legislature has
undertaken to -transfer the title of the claimant to the occupant
unless the claimant agrees to terms. . . . Lands thus granted
(he means grants by the state to individuals) become the absolute
property of the grantee, in virfue of a contract made with the gov6rnment of which the patent is the evidence. I know of no principle
which will allow the government, any more than an individual, after
fairly selling and conveying land, to take back the land and resume
the title at its own pleasure against the assent of the grantee. Neither
am I acquainted with any principle which will allow the government
to annex new conditions unknown at the time of the original contract; and for a violation of them, seize the land, divest the citizen of
his title, and retain the consideration which the citizen paid or rendered, without remunerating him therefor. Those constitutional
provisions which were intended to secure the inviolability of contracts apply as well to contracts made between the government of a
state and its citizen *as to contracts between individuals . ..
The contract in the present case was this, that Harvie and his heirs
and assigns should enjoy the land granted forever in eonsideration
of so much paid to the state. The mode and manner of enjoyment;
they were therefore left to the volition of the grantee. His dominion
was not limited at the time of his purchase. . . . He had as a
free man, all those rights and priileges which constitute the birthright of an American citizen. The effect of the act in question is to
change the tenure and the contract. . . . N man purchases
land either from the state or from an individual in fee simple without
taking and holdina it untrammeled in the manner of using it. The
very object of making the purchase is to obtain the exclusive control,
and to get clear of any control over it by the vendor."
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This truly astounding rhapsody upon the absolutism of the
freedom from governmental restraint which is supposed to constitute the birthright of an American citizen is sufficiently emphatic
without the addition of comment. The same judge said, in Davis
v. Ballard:
"I do not admit that there is any sovereign power, in the literal
meaning of the terms, to be found anywhere in our system of government. ...
In the nature of things there is as much propriety, it sems to me, in forfeiting a horse to the government because his proprietor does not curry and rub him well, or break him to
labor quietly in the gear, as there is in forfeiting land because the
owner does not choose to clear and cultivafe a part, and deaden the
trees growing on another part."
12. The conception of the American people is that of Allodial tenure; and
the principle of allodial tenure is accepted and practised in every American State.

The difficulties in the way of laying down any common law of
tenure in the American states seems insuperable. The adjudicated
cases are few, and they generally confuse the concepts of sovereignty,
police power and feudal tenure in such way as to make the opinions
almost valueless. Writers and judges have as a rule not been able to
free themselves from the false preconception that the feudal system
furnishes all our analogies. The statutes use the word "tenure" without defining it, and the feudal definition is inconsigtent with our
changed condition, and with the present practices and customs of the
people, Invariably there is a failure to distinguish between tenure
under the state and the holding by one private person of another
private person. In Pennsylvania the early cases are most emphatic
in holding that tenure does not exist in that state. In Virginia
tenures of all kinds were abolished by statute in 1779. But it is.to
be remarked that those were the times of the new broom, when many
old things were swept away. Yet only what was considered worn-out
trash was affected; and when the statutes speak of abolishing tenure,
they must be taken to mean such a conception of tenure as was in the
minds of the people at the time; that is, feudal tehure. In S6uth
Carolina tenure in free and common socage exists. The Georgia stat-
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ute provides: "The tenure by which all realty is held in this state
is under the state as original owner; it is without service of any
kind, and limited only by the right of eminent domain remaining in
the state."
The New York statute of 1779 ordained: "The absolute property
of all messuages, lands, tenements, hereditaments, and all prerogatives
escheats . . . which before the ninth of July,
1776, did vest in or belong to the Crown of Great Britain be and are
declared to be . . . vested in the people of this state, in whom
the sovereignty and seigniority thereof are and were united on and
from the ninth of July, 1776." This statute declares expressly that
the sovereignty and overlordship of lands is in the people of the state,
which is the same as saying that those powers shall be exercised
through the orderly machinery of the state as may be ordained by
law.
In 1787, four years after the treaty of peace, a statute was
enacted in New York (as cited in Gray's Perpetuities) which provided that "the purchaser of lands shall hold them of the chief
lord of the fee, but all tenures were turned into free and common
socage; tha the tenure of all grants made or to be made by the
state should be alodial and not feudal, and in free and pure allodium
only." About fifty years after the date of the latter statute, the
New York legislature enacted: "All lands within this state are declared to be allodial, so that, subject to the liability to escheat, the
entire and absolute property is vested in the owners, according to the
nature of their respective estates; and all fetidal tenures, of every
description, with all their incidents, are abolished."
It is. to be
noticed (1) Tenure as a p'rinciple is not abolished, but recognized;
but feudal tenure is discontinued. (2) Allodial holding is substituted for feudal tenure. (3) Read in connection with the prior statute,
the following propositions result: (a) Sovereignty and overlordship
exist, but are reposed in the inhabitants, to be exercised through
orderly procedure of law. (b) The entire property right is in the
owner, subject to the ultimate ownership of the State. (c) The use
of the term "allodial" introduces a conception which is not feudal by
reference or analogy.
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13. The relation resulting between the State and the private landowner
can be discovered only in the tracings of the historical progress of the
English and American peoples from Saxon times to the present.

According to the accepted view of the private landholder since
the revolution, the grantee of the state is his own lord proprietor,
and owns both the property right and the right to the enjoyment
and use of the land. So simple a statement seems sufficient for "practical" purposes to the "practical" man-that astigmatic person-and
may answer the needs of an owner of land in an isolated territory
where the titles originated from the state only yesterday; for the subtleties which always attach themselves to the theories and doctrines
of landholding in time, lurk yet in' the grass abiding their opportunity. When he goes into court, however, to defend his title, he
finds that his lawyer has to talk in terms of principles whose definitions he does not understand, and whose applications lhe does not
appreciate. For the law proceeds upon lines of principles which are
evolved out of experience and logical analysis, and that which obtains
today is only a flash in the line of transition from what was yesterday to what will be tomorrow. Today's experience has no value
nor realization until tomorrow, when it can be observed, analyzed,
related and classified. The law of yesterday is the law of today until
today is passed. Thus we are today struggling in the American
courts to reduce to concepts and to invent terms for the products of
the evolution that has been going on for generations in the law of
landholding. The books are full of opinions, views and theories ani1ounced by judges and writers, but they exhibit such a deplorable
lack of common viewpoint, and the use of common terms in the same
sense that no satisfying conclusion can be gathered from them. The
principles involved can only be apprehended through a consideration
of original conceptions making their way through an experience of
change and modification beginning in Saxon England, extending
through feudal England, through our own colonial period, and
through the period of independence; in all respects as the serpent became the subtlest beast by casting off one part, modifying another,
and evolving new and additional parts and functions.
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14. The true analogies by which to interpret the present-day customs of
landholding In the American States are to be found in the Saxon customs of the Common Law of Kent.

No doubt is held out by the historians and jurists today but that
under the Saxon system, prior to the conquest and the institution of
the Norman feudal system in England, landholding from the king
and lords upon terms of personal fealty and military service was unknown. Under the Saxons the owner held-his land as his own, both
in property right and in the enjoyment of the fruits. He was protected in his possessioll and enjoyment, but he did not owe the king
or anyone else the performance of any peculiar duties as conditions
of his holding. Professor Roberksohsays (Elementary Law, p. 76):
"This system of estates is the outgrowth of those landholding customs
which prevailed in the agricultural districts of England during the
Saxon and Norman periods of its history. . . . The introduction of the feudal system gradually changed the village communities
(of the Saxons) into feudal manors, in ivhich the title to the land and
the political supremacy were vested in a feudal lord; the villagers became his free or serf tenants." Mr. Digby says: "Land owned by a
subject and not held of a lord is called allodial land, and a system of
allodial ownership appears to have preceded the feudal system in
England, the land then ovned being termed, according to the mode
of acquisition, 'book land,' or 'folk land.' " Upon this the author
of the article, Real Property in Halsbury's ]aws of England, comments: "Such ownership is assumed to have been-at any rate as to
book land or land received by grant-absolute ownership, and the
term 'allodium' is used to denote land owned absolutely." It is to
be further remarked that the term "allodium" was probably not in
use in Saxon times, but was introduced by the feucti-ts to make the
distinction between an absolute or free holding and a vassal or feud
holding. In Clement v. Scudamore, 6 Mod. 120, the court said: "It
appears (though Coke is said to be of a contrary opinion) that all
the lands in England before the conquest, and for some time after,
were generally Gavelkind." Lord Mansfiel-a said in Doe v. Llandaff,
2 Bos. & Pul. (N. R.) 491: "The law of Gavelkind is unlike other
customs. It is not good if it begins only just before the reign of
Richard the First.
This custom existed long before any such cus-
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toms, and almost before any history. In some places ft is called the
Common Law of Kent. . . . The real history of the custom in
Kent is, that the conqueror granted to the people of Rent"their preexisting rights; having made a convention with them, by which he
permitted them to retain their ancient laws and customs. The
descent by Gavelkind was probably the rule of descent throughout
the whole kingdom . . . Spelman treats this custom as having
been the general law of the kingdom. In Selden's Analecta Anglo
Britannica, an account is given of the conquest and of the reigns
-hortly before. The common story of the Kentish merx marching
against the Conqueror in great numbers, covered with boughs and
appearing like a moving wood, is there related, and the convention
made with the Conqueror by which they were permitted to retain
their ancient laws and customs is there spoken of."
All grants of lands in the American colonies by the king contained the provision that they should be held "according to the free
tenure of lands in East Greenwich, in the county of Kent, in England." Blackstone says: "Such is the custom of Gavelkind in Kent,
and some other parts of the kingdom (though perhaps it was also
general till the Norman conquest) which ordains among other things
that not the eldest son only of the father shall succeed to his inheritance, but all the sons alike, and that though the ancestor be attainted
and hanged, yet the heir shall succeed to his estate without any
escheat to the lord. And again he says: "It is universally known
what struggles the Kentish men made to preserve their ancient liberties, and with how much success those struggles were attended.
And as it is principally here that we meet with the custom of Gavelkind (though it was and is to be found in some other parts, of the
kingdom) we may fairly conclude that this was a part of those liberties, agreeably to Mr. Selden's opinion, that Gavelkind before the
Norman conquest was the general custom of the realm. "
15. The Custom of Gavelkind, or Common Law of Kent had no features in
common with the feudal system, but is more nearly in accord with the
present customs in America.

The main incidents of allo dial holding of land are thus given in
detail in 2 Corpus Juris 1152-1153: "Allodial lands were alienable
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at the will of the owner by sale, gift or last will. They were liable for
his debts, and descended, if undevised, to his heirs without respect to
primogeniture. They might be granted absolutely or for a limited
interest, on any conditions or services the grantor thought proper,
and for any estate, to take effect at once, or at a future time, or on
the happening of some event. They were frequently entailed, and
marriage settlements thereof were common. They were conveyed by
the delivery of a symbol of possession, as a twig or turf, or by writiug or charter, called a land boc, which was generally deposited in a
monastery for safe keeping."
Professor Reeves states in his work on Real Property, sec. 299:
"Ii must be remembered that the feudal system mingled and
confused property rights with political authority and responsibilities, and that the charters from the king to the colonial proprietors
conveyed together without making any very clear distinctions between them, both governmental jurisdiction and territorial proprietorship. Political sovereignty and overlordship of all their lands were
thus confused in the minds of the colonists. They made no clear distinction between the king as a feudal lord and tie king as a hated
despot. And when the despotism had been thrown off, it was natural
for them to assume that the feudalism had been done away with. They
had brought with them. it is true, and retained in their systeems of
jurisprudence most of the common ad statute law of the mother
country; but this they would inevitably modify as the nature of the
times and the conditions of the country required. And feudalism as
a system was out of harmony with the American spirit. We
could have expected therefore, a priori, the result that followed,
namely, that most of the old states and all of the new ones would declare by positive statute or judicial determination, or would tocitly
assume, that all lands within their jurisdictions should be held and
owned allodially. . .
And it seems to be perfectly safe to assert that, in the other states and territories where no affirmative law
upon the sub ject is to be found, it has been assumed and will always
be maintained, thot no real property within their jurisdiction is
held nder any feudal tenure or incidents."
Professor Walker says in American Law, see. 141:
"Our citizens (he is speaking with special reference to the inhabitants of the Northwest Territory, and wrote in 1837) hold of no
superior. What they own they own absolutely and ind , ndently.
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All estates are in the broadest sense allodial. The only provision
which bears the most remote analogy to the doctrine of holding of
a superior is, that the people of the state, in their collective and sovereign capacity, have an ultimate riht to all land within their jurisdiction, when it so happens that there is no other legal owner; in
which case the law makes it escheat to them; and this right of escheat
bears some resemblance to that of the lord paramount. But it has its
origin in the most obvious considerations of public policy, and can
in no sense be regarded as a relic of the feudal system. We do
indeed still retain some of the legal terms to which that system gave
rise. Thus we speak of the manner of holding as a tenure, of the
thing holden as a tenement, and of the person holding as a tenant;
but we use these terms in a modified sense. So we recognize a relation of landlord and tenant, respecting which some of the rules
have taken their complexion from the feudal relation of lord and
-vassal. But this is all; and we may therefore dismiss the subject of
tenure as having no other than a speculative interest for us."
16. Although the present relationship between the State and the private
landowner has no peculiar terms and definitions of its own, yet some
principles and doctrines may be formulated and taken as established.

Out of the great mass of dicta by the courts and of opinion from
text writers, many of them exhibiting a sad lacking of acquaintance
with principles and their relations to each other, it is impossible at
present to lay down the principles of an articulated system of landholding of the state. Until a case arises and there is an adjudication
by the courts, it is submitted that the following may be taken as
established. Feudal tenure is contrary to our institutions, and has
Veen supplanted by the free or allodial holding of land which was the
custom of the Saxon freeholders prior to the institution of the feudal
system, and is the same as that recognized by the law of nations;
that the feudal system as a political institution has been repudiated
both by the common understanding and practice of the people, and
by judicial decision and legislative enactment; that the American
state did not assume the position of feudal lord paramount; that
fealty or personal allegiance to the sovereign fell because no person was substituted for the king to whom it could be due; that allegiance to the state was substituted for personal fealty; that the
states did not assume the prerogative to grant lands upon conditions
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of feudal tinure; that they did not establish as part of their constitutions the dogma that the sovereign is the owner of all the lands so as
that a grantee became a -tenant of the state; that the lands were
vested in the state "in its sovereign capacity for the preservation and
protection of public interests;" and of private rights as well, both
those which had been acquired before the revolution and such as
might be acquired afterwards; that the prerogatives and regalities of
the Crown were extinguished by the accomplishment of the revolution; that the status of Crown grants and the parcelling of the public domain fell to the people to 'be regulated in such manner as they
might prescribe; that citizenship and participation in the government were not based essentially upon the holding of land, nor did
they have any necessary relation thereto; that holding of the state
exists, but the relation is not feudal, but political only, importing no
distinctive duties on the part of the state, and no distinctive obligation on the part of the holder; that this relation of landholding which
exists between the state and the private citizen cannot exist between
one private person and another; that the state cannot grant lands
upon special terms, but only upon terms of free and common custom;
that the terms of this relation, as far as they are defined at persent,
are the terms of the citizen's allegiance to the state; that no forfeiture of lands to the state exists, even for treason; that the king,
clergy and lords proprietors, to whose support feudal tenure was essential, have been abolishd; that aspect of the clergy represented by
the lawyers being saved by their circumspect bearing and zealous and
efficient service in the republic; that the legislature has no power to
restore the feudal system, or any of its features; that the state has
no reversionary interest nor possibility of reverter in lands granted
by it, nor is it the ultimate inheritor of lands made vacant by the
death of the .owner without heirs; that the colonists brought over
with them and established a traditional fight against feudalism; that
the only remains of feudal holding known to the American colonists
were fealty to the king's or lord's person, and rent; that both fealty
and rent were nominal and political only, being for the purpose of
preserving the king's prerogative, not affecting landholding except
in respect of the theories of conveyancing; that the colonists after
the revolution parcelled out the lands according to the theories of the
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law of nations, and established a relation between the state and the
landholder which was consistent in fact with the spirit of individual
political freedom which they had won in fact; that after the feudal
system had been eliminated, the essential characteristics of sovereignty
emerged, and are recognized because of their being inherent in the
sovereignty of every state, not because they were sanctioned by any
feudal origin; that of these characteristic and sovereign powers, the
following are fully recognized under the : merican system: War
power, power to define and enforce allegiance, parcelling, eminent
domain, escheat, police power. These are antecedent to and superior
to any specialized organization, such as the feudal system. Their
supremacy is essential to the existence of any special system.

